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who disposed of the animals segregated for breeding
purposes.28 Section 1231 treatment has been available
where heifers were purchased to start a breeding herd and
several months later the taxpayer sold the animals because
weather conditions made feeding difficult.29 Likewise,
Section 1231 treatment has been approved where the
taxpayer abandoned plans for leasing cattle for dairy and
breeding purposes.30
Facts suggesting that a livestock operation is a tax
shelter are not helpful in proving use for the necessary
purpose. Thus, in such a case in which the taxpayer bred
gilts at 11 months of age and sold bred gilts at 13 months of
age, the Tax Court disregarded the taxpayer's arguments and
held the gilts had not been used for breeding purposes.31
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The disputed property was located on the
defendant’s side of a creek between a fence and the creek.
The defendant’s title stated that the bank of the creek was
the boundary; however, after a dam was built, the creek
expanded and the new bank was closer to the fence. The
plaintiff argued that the title was insufficient to describe the
boundary because the creek bank changed from time to
time. The court held that the title description was sufficient
because the original bank was somewhere beyond the
current bank and enclosed the disputed property. The
plaintiff also argued that the fence was the boundary line.
The court upheld the jury verdict for the defendant as
supported by sufficient evidence that the fence was not
“designedly enclosed,” that the plaintiff’s grazing of cattle
on the land was not hostile possession, and that the fence
was a casual fence used to keep cattle from the creek.
Dellana v. Walker, 866 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. The debtor was a farmer
and feed dealer who borrowed operating funds from a bank
which had an unperfected security interest in the debtor’s
accounts receivable. On the 91st day before the bankruptcy
petition, the debtor gave the bank a check in partial payment
of the loan, but the check was dated for the next day and
was not recorded by the bank until the next day. The court
held that the funds were considered received by the bank
when it recorded the payment; therefore, the transfer was
within 90 days of the petition and avoidable by the trustee.
The bank also collected on several of the accounts
receivable pre-petition by loaning funds to the debtor’s
customers who paid the proceeds back to the bank which
applied the payments on the debtor’s loan.  The bank argued
that it was allowed to do this under the “earmarking
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doctrine” which allowed a debtor to substitute a third party
creditor for an existing creditor. The court held that the bank
was not eligible for use of this doctrine because the bank’s
actions substituted a third party debtor for the existing
debtor and allowed the bank to deplete the bankruptcy estate
in its favor through pre-bankruptcy actions. In re Jones, 161
B.R. 809 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had purchased cattle weekly
from the creditor cattle market for some time by purchasing
the cattle one week and paying for the purchased cattle the
following week just before purchasing additional cattle.
When the creditor noticed that the debtor was purchasing
increased amounts of cattle, the creditor sought assurance
that the cattle would be paid for, which the debtor did.
However, two weeks later, the debtor failed to pay for the
previous week’s purchases and filed for bankruptcy. The
creditor sought an order of nondischarge of the debtor under
Section 727(a) but argued at trial that the debt was
nondischargeable under Section 523 for fraud.  The court
held that because the creditor presented evidence only as to
the dischargeability of the debt under Section 523 but pled
only nondischarge of the debtor under Section 727, the
complaint would be dismissed. However, the court also
ruled that even under Section 523, the debt was
dischargeable because the creditor failed to show any intent
by the debtor to defraud the creditor. In re Cox, 161 B.R.
687 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor had inherited
unimproved real estate in 1983 and built a house on the
property using community funds. Under a divorce decree,
the debtor’s spouse was awarded judgment for one-half of
the value of the house and other improvements on the
property and the debtor sought to avoid the judgment lien as
impairing the homestead exemption. The court held that
because the debtor’s interest in the property arose before the
judgment lien, the lien could be avoided. In re Parrish, 7 F.
3d 76 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 161 B.R. 765 (W.D. Tex.
1992), aff’g, 144 B.R. 349 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
HOMESTEAD. When the debtor filed for Chapter 11,
the debtor’s residence was valued at less than the total of the
mortgage against the house and the debtor’s exemption
amount. During the case, the debtor was unsuccessful at
reorganizing and agreed to sell the house and convert the
case to Chapter 7. By the time the sale was approved, the
house had appreciated significantly such that other claims
could be paid from the proceeds. The debtor argued that
because the value of the house on the date of the petition
did not exceed the mortgage balance and the exemption
amount, the house was not estate property and the entire
proceeds left after payment of the mortgage belonged to the
debtor. The trustee argued that the debtor should not receive
any of the post-petition appreciation and was entitled only to
the exemption amount available on the date of the petition.
The court held a middle ground, allowing the debtor only
the full amount of the exemption but allowing all other
appreciation to be paid to the other creditors. In re Alsberg,
161 B.R. 680 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
SETOFF. The debtor was a grain elevator which lost its
license in November 1991 and was closed on December 30,
1991 by the Illinois Bureau of Warehouses. In January
1992, a bank with a security interest in the debtor’s assets
set off the funds in the debtor’s account against the amount
owed to the bank. Two weeks later an involuntary
bankruptcy petition was filed against the debtor. Under
Illinois law, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 205/40, a grain producer
has a statutory lien on the grain assets of an elevator until
paid. The Chapter 7 trustee sought to recover the setoff
funds under Sections 551 and 544 by first avoiding the grain
producer’s statutory lien and then enforcing the lien against
the bank or by merely enforcing the statutory lien against
the bank. The court held that the setoff removed the bank
account funds from estate property; therefore, the trustee
could not reach the funds under Section 551 which applies
only to property of the estate. The court also held that the
trustee could not recover the funds under Section 544(a)
because neither the state nor a grain producer could garnish
the funds once setoff by a holder of a security interest in the
funds. The court also held that Section 544(b) did not apply
because the section only applied to unsecured claims. In re
Ostrom-Martin, Inc., 161 B.R. 800 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
TRUSTEE’S FEES. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan
included payment through the trustee of 100 percent of the
unsecured claims and direct payments to a secured creditor
on a secured claim which was modified by the plan. The
court treated this claim as impaired by the plan. The plan
provided for no trustee’s fee for the payments directly to the
secured creditor and the trustee objected to confirmation of
the plan for failing to provide for the standing trustee fee of
10 percent on the payments made during the plan on the
secured claim.  The court held that payments on an impaired
claim were treated as made “under the plan;” therefore,
under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e), the debtor had to pay the trustee’s
fee on such payments. In re Marriott, 161 B.R. 816
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993).
Although a bank had a secured claim against the debtor,
the debtor’s plan made no provision for the claim. Instead,
the debtor and the bank reached a negotiated agreement
which provided for payments on the claim outside of the
bankruptcy plan. The bank stated to the court that the
concessions granted by the bank were voluntary and that the
bank did not see its claim as impaired. The court found that
the agreement was not an attempt by the debtor to
circumvent the trustee’s fee provision because the debtor’s
plan provided for payment of all unsecured creditors
through the trustee. The court held that the payments made
to the bank were not made under the plan, were not made on
an impaired claim and were not subject to the trustee’s fee.
In re Kosmicki, 161 B.R. 828 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS OF TAXES.
The debtor was a corporation which had filed for Chapter 7.
The debtor had failed to pay federal withholding taxes and
the IRS assessed the 100 percent penalty, under I.R.C. §
6672, against the debtor’s president. The president
petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for an order requiring the
IRS to allocate any tax payments made by the Chapter 7
trustee on the tax claims first to the trust fund portion of the
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taxes, in order to reduce the president’s liability for the
withholding taxes. The Bankruptcy Court issued an order
requiring a partial payment of the undisputed tax claim and
requiring the IRS to apply the payment to the trust fund
taxes. The District Court reversed, holding that the
Bankruptcy Court had no authority to order the allocation of
the tax payments in a Chapter 7 case. The court stated that
the rationale for allowing such payments in Chapter 11
cases, as provided in In re Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S.
545 (1990) (allocation allowed where needed to insure
successful reorganization; IRS protected by continued
operation of debtor)was not present in a Chapter 7 case. In
re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 161 B.R. 640 (S.D.
Ohio 1993).
As part of the debtor's liquidating Chapter 11 plan, the
major asset, a ski resort, was sold to produce proceeds
which were to completely pay federal taxes.  However, after
the IRS increased the claim because of a clerical error, the
creditor's committee sought an order requiring the IRS to
allocate payments to trust fund taxes first.  The court held
that even though the Chapter 11 plan was a liquidating plan,
the allocation of tax payments would be allowed because the
allocation was necessary for successful completion of the
liquidating plan.  In re Deer Park, Inc., 10 F.3d 1478 (9th
Cir. 1993), aff’g, 136 B.R. 815 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992).
DISCHARGE. After losing a Tax Court case which
held that the debtor owed taxes, the debtor married his long-
time companion and executed an antenuptial agreement
which transferred all of the assets of a corporation owned by
the debtor to the debtor’s spouse’s corporation. In return, the
spouse transferred to the debtor debts owed to her by the
debtor. Neither set of assets had much value because the
debtor’s corporation had been incurring substantial losses.
However, because the debtor’s corporation owned the
debtor’s residence and vehicles, the antenuptial agreement
effectively removed from the debtor’s estate all assets
against which the IRS could levy to satisfy the Tax Court
judgment. The IRS petitioned for nondischarge of the debtor
on the tax claims for willful and fraudulent attempt to evade
taxes. The court held that the tax debt was nondischargeable
because the intentional and voluntary transfer of the
debtor’s assets without adequate consideration to a family
member was a willful and fraudulent attempt to evade taxes.
In re Griffith, 161 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
TAX LIENS. The debtor, an owner of two radio
stations, had granted security interests in all of its assets,
including accounts receivable, which were perfected prior to
March 1991. In March 1991, the IRS filed a tax lien against
the debtor’s assets. The radio stations were sold in the
bankruptcy case and the IRS claimed a priority security
interest in the accounts receivable starting on the 46th day
after the filing of the tax lien. The court held that under
I.R.C. § 6323(c) the tax lien had priority over the accounts
receivable earned after 45 days after the filing of the lien
until the lien was satisfied. In re Thomas




CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
plaintiff had signed up four fields in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). After a dispute with the ASCS
over an offset claimed by the SBA in the CRP payments, the
ASCS discovered crops planted on a portion of the CRP
acres. In a county committee hearing on the plaintiff’s
violation of the CRP contracts, the plaintiff indicated that
the plantings were done in protest of the SBA offset
problem. The county committee decision that the plantings
were intentional and not in good faith and that the CRP
contracts be terminated was upheld on appeal to DASCO.
The court held that a DASCO determination that a CRP
participant had failed to comply with a CRP contract was a
discretionary function not appealable to the federal courts.
In the alternative, the court held that the DASCO decision
was not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion because the
plaintiff’s own testimony supported the finding that the
plantings were intentional. Small v. U.S., 838 F. Supp. 427
(E.D. Mo. 1993).
FEDERAL SEED ACT-ALM § 10.02.*  The plaintiff
imported fescue lawn grass seed from Argentina. The seed
was inspected by the Plant Protection Quarantine and Plant
Health Inspection Services and found to contain serrated
tussock seed which was listed as a noxious weed under the
Federal Noxious Weed Act (FNWA) but not under the
Federal Seed Act (FSA) because the USDA had not issued
regulations listing the weed as noxious under the FSA.
Because the inspectors’ manuals stated that seed governed
by the FSA was not subject to the FNWA, the seed was
allowed into the country. The plaintiff then processed the
seed and distributed it to retailers across the country.
Meanwhile, the APHIS/PPQ officials determined that the
former policy was insufficient and determined that any seed
containing a noxious weed under either statute should be
barred from import into the U.S. and required the plaintiff to
recall the seed and either destroy the seed or export it. The
plaintiff sued for compensation. The court held that the
FNWA was clear in that it did not apply to agricultural or
vegetable seeds, which were governed by the FSA, and
because grass seed was governed by the FSA, the FNWA
did not apply to the plaintiff’s seed. The court
acknowledged that this occurrence was probably overlooked
by the USDA when it established the noxious weed
regulations under the FSA because the U.S is usually only
an exporter of agricultural and vegetable seeds, but that this
error did not justify ignoring the plain language of the
FNWA. Pennington Seed, Inc. v. U.S., 10 F.3d 6 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
MARKETING ORDERS-ALM § 10.05[1].* The
plaintiffs were orange producers who were members of a
cooperative which block voted for an orange marketing
order in a referendum under 7 U.S.C. § 608 and 7 C.F.R. §§
907.83, 908.83. The regulations allowed cooperatives to
vote for their members with the cooperative’s vote
considered as a vote of each of the members. The plaintiffs
argued that the block voting provision was unconstitutional
under the First and Fifth Amendments because the plaintiffs
were not allowed to vote separately in the referendum. The
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court held that the voting procedure did not violate the First
Amendment because the plaintiffs were voluntary members
of the cooperative and could withdraw from the cooperative
in order to cast a separate vote. The court also held that the
procedure was not subject to strict scrutiny under the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection clause because the
marketing order election was not the type for which the
right to vote was a fundamental right, such as in
governmental elections; therefore, the procedure was valid
if it had a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose. The court held that the procedure
was rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purposes of encouraging memberships in cooperatives and
in furthering an efficient marketing system for oranges.
Cecelia Packing v. U.S. D.A., 10 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent owned
an interest in a corporation which operated a cattle raising
business on ranch land leased from the decedent. The
decedent had granted a general durable power of attorney to
the decedent’s daughter which gave the daughter the power
to “do any and every act and exercise that I might or could
do … as fully as I myself might do if I were present…,”
including the right to sell, convey or mortgage the
decedent’s property. The daughter conveyed by gift several
fractional interests in the decedent’s interest in the
corporation to family members, including the daughter. The
IRS ruled that under federal and Texas law the power to
convey the decedent’s property did not include the power to
convey the property for no consideration; therefore, the
daughter had no authority to make the gifts and the
transferred interests in the corporation were included in the
decedent’s gross estate.   Ltr. Rul. 9403004, Oct. 8, 1993.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].* The decedent owned an undivided interest
in a ranch land with the other interests held by family
members. The ranch land was cash leased to a corporation
which owned and operated a cattle raising operation on the
land. The decedent owned a percentage of the corporation.
The IRS treated the decedent’s interests in the ranch land
and the corporation as separate interests and did not discuss
the decedent’s involvement in operating the cattle business
through the corporation. The IRS ruled that the cash rental
of the ranch land to the corporation, without any services
provided by the decedent in the rental, was a passive
investment not eligible for installment payment of estate tax
under I.R.C. § 6166(b) as an interest in a closely held
business. Ltr. Rul. 9403004, Oct. 8, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s estate included 400 shares of preferred stock and
37,728 shares of common stock in a corporation. A portion
of the preferred shares, representing a minority interest,
were bequeathed to the surviving spouse and the common
shares and remainder of the preferred shares were
bequeathed to a credit shelter trust for the surviving spouse
and two children. The estate and IRS agreed that the value
of the two blocks of stock valued separately was less than
the value of the shares valued as one block. The IRS cited
Ahmanson Foundation v. U.S., 764 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981)
for the rule that the value of stock in an estate is determined
by ownership of the decedent as of the date of death and is
not affected by a split in ownership by the beneficiaries;
therefore, the value of the stock was to be determined by
valuing the stock in one block.  However, the value of the
stock passing to the surviving spouse for purposes of the
marital deduction was to be discounted for the passing of a
minority interest in the corporation. Ltr. Rul 9403005, Oct.
14, 1993.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had transferred stock to a
trust and retained the power to alter the beneficial interests
in the trust. The decedent also retained other stock in the
same corporation. Both blocks of stock were included in the
decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2038 and the
estate sought a determination as to whether the stock should
be aggregated for estate tax valuation purposes. The IRS
cited Rev. Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294 which provided that
stock included in the decedent’s estate under I.R.C. § 2035
for being a transfer within three years of death was to be
valued with other stock included in the estate under I.R.C. §
2033. The IRS ruled that the trust stock and stock held by
the decedent were to be aggregated for purposes of
determining the fair market value for estate tax purposes.
Ltr. Rul 9403002, Sept. 17, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES . In Indopco v. Comm’r, 112 S.
Ct. 1039 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that the
creation or enhancement of a separate asset was not a
prerequisite for requiring capitalization of the expense. The
IRS ruled that the clarification in Indopco did not affect the
fundamental principles for determining whether an
expenditure which produces benefits beyond the current tax
year must be capitalized. The IRS ruled that incidental
repairs could still be currently deductible even though the
repairs have some future benefit. Rev. Rul. 94-12, I.R.B.
1994-8.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers had
established a tax-exempt charitable foundation and partially
funded the foundation by giving the foundation futures
contracts purchased by the taxpayers. After amendment of
I.R.C. § 1256 which required year-end recognition of gains
and losses on futures contracts, the gifts of the contracts to
the foundation differed in that the taxpayers reserved the
short-term gains for the taxpayers. The court held that the
taxpayers were entitled to a charitable deduction for the
value of the long-term gains accrued by the contracts
because the taxpayers had no control over the disposition of
the contracts.   Greene v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,022 (2d Cir. 1994), aff’g, 806 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.
N.Y. 1993).
C CORPORATIONS
STOCK REDEMPTION. The taxpayer was the subject
of a takeover bid by another corporation. After the taxpayer
took several steps to avoid the takeover, the other
corporation agreed to withdraw its offer if the taxpayer
would redeem all of the other corporation’s stock in the
taxpayer. The taxpayer redeemed the stock and claimed the
cost as a current business expense deduction. The taxpayer
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argued that under Five Star Manufacturing Co. v. Comm’r,
355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966), the redemption cost was
currently deductible as an attempt to preserve the taxpayer.
The court noted that Five Star may not be valid any longer
but held that even under Five Star, the redemption was not
eligible for the current deduction because the taxpayer’s
survival was not threatened by the takeover bid; therefore,
the redemption cost had to be capitalized by the taxpayer.
Houston Pipe Line Co. v. U.S., 838 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.
Tax. 1993).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayers sued their employer for violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq., and sought back pay, liquidated damages,
reinstatement, an injunction, costs and fees. The parties
reached a settlement with the employer paying an amount
for back pay and liquidated damages. The court held that the
settlement payments were excludible from gross income
because the Act provided a tort-like personal injury liability
and a right to a jury trial. Bennett v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,044 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
The taxpayers sued a creditor for failure to release a lien
and won a jury verdict for lost profits, actual damages,
attorney’s fees and punitive damages. However, the
taxpayers negotiated with the lender and in exchange for the
lender’s waiver of an appeal, the taxpayers settled for a
reduced amount. The taxpayers requested that the settlement
allocate the amount 95 percent to mental anguish and 5
percent for lost profits. The lender testified that it had no
interest in the allocation and went along with the taxpayers’
request. The court held that the allocation of the agreement
would not be followed because it was made only to
minimize the taxpayers’ tax liability. The court used the
original jury verdict allocations to reallocate the settlement
amount. Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 7 (1994).
ENERGY INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  The
taxpayer operated a bone processing facility which
processed animal bones into gelatin bone.  The taxpayer
argued that the facility qualified as recycling equipment
eligible for the energy investment tax credit because the
exclusion of animal waste from the definition of recovery
property in Treas. Reg. § 1.48-9(g) was invalid.  The Tax
Court held that the regulation was invalid in that the
exclusion of animal waste was not authorized by the statute
and held that the taxpayer's bone processing facility was
eligible for the credit. The appellate court reversed holding
that the regulation was valid given the legislative history of
the statute which indicated that the credit was available only
where the end product was the same as the product which
generated the waste. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 94-1
U.S. T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,021 (10th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 98 T.C.
127 (1992).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
DEFINITION. The IRS has ruled that the Pennsylvania
limited partnership statute, Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8501 et seq.,
corresponds to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for
purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. Rul. 94-10,
I.R.B. 1994-6, 12.
PAYMENTS INCIDENT TO A DIVORCE. Under
the divorce decree, the taxpayer’s 50 percent interest in a
corporation owned by both spouses was redeemed. The
taxpayer argued that no gain was recognized by the transfer
because the transfer was made incident to a divorce decree
on the behalf of the other spouse. Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.1041-1T, Q & A 9, requires transfers to a third party to be
made on behalf of the other spouse.  The court found no
benefit to the other spouse from the transfer as was found in
Arnes v. Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,016 (9th
Cir. 1992)  where the transfer enabled the other spouse to
retain a business franchise; therefore, the court held that the
transfer was not made on the behalf of the other spouse.
Blatt v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 5 (1994).
PAYMENT OF WAGES IN COMMODITIES-ALM
§ 4.06[2].*  The taxpayer was a corporation which operated
a grain farm. The corporation was wholly-owned by a
married couple who were treated as employees of the
corporation, providing all of the management and much of
the labor required in the raising and harvesting of grain. The
corporation paid the couple cash wages and occasionally
grain in compensation for their work. The grain was not
removed to separate storage facilities owned separately by
the couple nor was the couple charged for storage of the
grain in the corporation’s storage facilities. The couple
located the purchasers of the grain and bore the loss or gain
on the grain after transfer to the couple. The corporation
conceded that the grain was always intended to be converted
to cash and that the method of payment was chosen because
it incurred no FICA taxes. The IRS ruled that the payment
of grain was subject to FICA taxes because (1) the grain was
not separated, (2) the employees also had control over the
corporation, (3) the grain was intended to be converted to
cash, and (4) no business purpose for the grain payment was
demonstrated. The IRS also ruled that because the
corporation made a conscious decision to make the grain
payments in an attempt to avoid FICA taxes, the corporation
was not eligible for an interest-free adjustment under I.R.C.
§ 6205. Ltr. Rul. 9403001, Aug. 17, 1993.
PENALTIES. The IRS has issued temporary
regulations amending the rules for imposition of the
accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. § 6664(c) for
transactions between related person in transfer price
adjustments under I.R.C. § 482. 59 Fed. Reg. 4791 (Feb. 2,
1994).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in January
1994, the weighted average is 7.43 percent with the
permissible range of 6.68 to 8.17 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 94-12, I.R.B. 1994-6, 13.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued Form 982, Reduction of
Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of Indebtedness, for
making the election under I.R.C. § 108 to exclude from
gross income the discharge of qualified real property
business indebtedness occurring in 1993. A new Form 982
will be issued for discharge of indebtedness occurring
during 1994. Ann. 94-11, I.R.B. 1994-4, 44.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
STOCK BASIS.  The taxpayer owned 100 percent of an
S corporation.  The taxpayer also owned a controlling
interest in a second S corporation which had loaned cash to
the first corporation without issuing promissory notes or
receiving interest. The first corporation paid the second
corporation all of the owed money and the second
corporation deposited the funds in its account. The second
corporation then paid the funds to the taxpayer who
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     39
deposited the funds in the taxpayer’s account. The taxpayer
then transferred the funds to the first corporation. The last
three transactions were all evidenced by promissory notes
and interest accrued but was not paid on the notes. The first
corporation incurred a loss in a later taxable year and the
taxpayer claimed the loss based on the increase in the
taxpayer’s stock basis from the loan. The IRS ruled that a
shareholder loan to a corporation does not increase the
shareholder’s stock basis unless the loan is the result of an
actual economic outlay by the taxpayer; therefore, because
the taxpayer had not made any additional outlay of personal
funds to the first corporation but merely shuffled funds
among the corporations and the taxpayer, the taxpayer could
not increase the basis of the stock by the amount of the loan.
Ltr. Rul. 9403003, Sept. 29, 1993.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer owned a
residence with the taxpayer’s separated spouse as tenants by
the entirety. The house was sold and the taxpayer shared in
the proceeds but did not include the taxpayer’s share of the
gain on the taxpayer’s separate tax return. The court held
that under Ohio law, the taxpayer was entitled to one-half of
the proceeds; therefore, the taxpayer was liable for one-half
of the realized gain on the sale of the house. Rosen v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-40.
LABOR
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were domestic migrant farm laborers
who worked picking apples in New York. The apple
growers had an arrangement with the Jamaican government,
a Jamaican bank and a travel agency under which the
government arranged for loans to Jamaican migrant workers
for travel costs to the New York orchards. The growers first
obtained permission from the INS to hire alien workers
under the H-2A program, then the growers notified the
Jamaican government of the number of workers needed. The
bank loaned the travel costs and the travel agency arranged
the travel and paid the carriers with the money obtained
from the workers. The bank was eventually reimbursed by
the growers once the workers worked a sufficient number of
hours. If a worker failed to work the sufficient number of
hours, no reimbursement was paid. The plaintiffs argued
that under the H-2A program regulations, the growers were
required to advance travel costs to domestic workers
because the growers advanced travel costs to the alien
workers through “collaboration” with the bank. The
Secretary of Labor ruled that the growers did not
“collaborate” with the bank because the growers were not at
risk as to the loaned travel expenses. The plaintiffs objected
to use of the “at risk” definition of “collaboration” as
contrary to the regulations. The court upheld as a reasonable
interpretation of the regulations the use of the at-risk test for
determining whether an employer collaborated with a third
party for advance payment of the travel costs. Orengo
Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TENANCY AT WILL-ALM § 13.05.*  The parties
executed a written two-year lease of farm land with $10,000
in annual cash rent. The tenant paid the first year’s rent
timely but paid only one-half of the second year’s rent. The
tenant was allowed to remain on the land another three years
and paid the remainder owed for the second year plus only
$5,000 per year for the extra three years. The trial court
accepted the testimony of the tenant that before the
expiration of the written lease, the parties discussed
lowering the rent for the last three years, with the tenant also
performing some additional maintenance work. These terms
were not put into a written lease. The landlord argued that
under La. Civ. Code § 2688, the lease continued at the same
rent for the three years. The court held that reconduction
(continuation of the lease on the original terms) of the lease
under Section 2688 did not apply because the parties
discussed new lease terms; therefore, the rent paid and
accepted by the landlord during the holdover period was
sufficient. Davis v. Alsup, 627 S.2d 775 (La. Ct. App.
1993).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
LATERAL DITCH. The parties each owned water use
rights on the Dry Cimarron River system. The plaintiff
accessed water via an upstream ditch and a border
downstream ditch. The defendant accessed the water use
rights through the downstream ditch. The plaintiff built a
lateral ditch which transported water from the upstream
ditch to the downstream ditch and then on to a field on the
other side of the downstream ditch, essentially adding water
to the downstream ditch to match the additional water taken
from the downstream ditch to irrigate the lower field. The
plaintiff sued for an injunction against the defendant from
blocking the use of the downstream ditch for the irrigation
of the lower field. The trial court granted the injunction. The
appellate court held that the injunction did not interfere with
the defendant’s water use rights and that plaintiff was not
required to obtain approval from the state engineer for the
change in method of accessing the water use right because
the plaintiff made no change in the use of the water. Deaf
Smith County Grain Processors, Inc. v. Dixon, 864 P.2d
812 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The defendants dug a
new channel for a creek which ran through their property.
The defendants were unable to obtain a permit from the U.S.
Corps of Engineers; therefore, the defendants could not put
in a channel block or fill in the old channel. The changes
caused increased flooding of the plaintiffs’ farm land and
the plaintiffs sought to have the creek put back in the old
channel. The defendants argued that the five year statute of
limitations for permanent nuisances applied to block the
suit. The court held that because no channel blocks were
built and because the old channel remained, the changes
were temporary since they could be quickly abated;
therefore, the ten-year statute of limitations for temporary
nuisances applied. The case was remanded because of a
recent Missouri Supreme Court decision which changed the
standard for control of surface water runoff from the
“common enemy doctrine” to the rule of reasonable use.







AGRICULTURAL USE. The defendant operated a
dog boarding, grooming, breeding and training business on
82 acres in a Rural Residential District which allowed only
agricultural use of the land. The defendant’s business
included dogs not owned by the defendant. The plaintiff
town had ordered the defendant to cease all aspects of the
dog handling business as not agricultural. The court held
that agricultural use of land included the raising of livestock
which included all domestic animals such as dogs.
However, the court also held that the boarding, grooming
and training of dogs not owned by the defendant was not an
agricultural use; therefore, the defendant could continue the
operation only with dogs owned by the defendant. Town of
Sturbridge v. McDowell, 624 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. Ct.
App. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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